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Abstract
This paper examines the effects of the environmental decentralization fostered by a 2006
reform of the Environmental Impact Assessment process in India. It adopts a triple differences
approach that compares treated and untreated sectors across states with different level of envi-
ronmental enforcement. Results based on firm-level data for the period 1998-2012 show that the
reform induced a decrease in firm births in states with stricter enforcement. The findings draw
attention on the consequences of great disparities in enforcement capacity in a decentralized
environment.
Keywords: Decentralization, firm births, environmental enforcement, India.
JEL: O14, Q58
1 Introduction
The decentralization of environmental regulation is often justified by the intention to make use of
better understanding of local environmental problems, to promote more transparent and efficient
use of natural resources and to increase local participation due to higher homogeneity of common
needs (Cistulli, 2002). There are, however, well recognized constrains on the successfulness of any
decentralization process such as weak administrative or technical capacity, lack of financial
resources, poor coordination between national and local policies and the risk of local elite capture.
In addition to these trade-offs, spillovers and heterogeneity across localities are crucial in
influencing the overall impact of decentralization (Besley and Coate, 2003).
The author would like to thank Hendrik Wolff, Teevrat Garg, Matt Khan, Phoebe Koundouri and the two
anonymous referees of this journal for the very helpful comments and suggestions. This research was partially
conducted as part of the green growth programme at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
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In India, environmental standards are decided by the central government but a large part of
environmental compliance, monitoring and enforcement is responsibility of state-level Pollution
Control Boards (SPCB). This paper examines the effects of further decentralization of
environmental decision-making on the birth of polluting firms. All registered polluting firms in
India are subject to an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Environmental clearance is
necessary for a firm to start operating and determines what pollution control measures should be
maintained operative. A 2006 reform of the EIA process delegated the responsibility over
environmental clearance of certain activities, previously under the control of the central
government, to newly established state-level authorities. The reform, therefore, introduced a new
source of variation in entry costs due to differences in the stringency of the EIA across states.
Because environmental enforcement has been found to vary notably across states, possibly due to
variations in socio-economic and political conditions but also due to state-specific technical and
financial constraints (Nandimath, 2009), differences in compliance costs could be large and are
expected to affect entry decisions and, ultimately, the distribution of new polluting firms across
states.
While the relationship between decentralized environmental regulation and firms’ behavior in
developed countries, and in particular in the US, has been investigated is several studies, there is
very little empirical evidence on developing countries. Developing countries differ substantially
from more advanced economies. Not only do they face greater trade-offs between the gains from
industrial growth and the related environmental costs but also institutions are substantially
different and political economy factors and market failures greatly affect policy making and
outcomes (Greenstone and Jack, 2015). This paper contributes to the field by investigating the
impact of the 2006 EIA reform that introduced further decentralized environmental regulation in
India and examines whether differences in enforcement capacity across states had produced
heterogeneous effects on the birth of polluting firms.
The empirical strategy exploits the reform design that assigns only certain polluting activities to
decentralized authorities (treated sectors), while for others the assessment remains centralized
(untreated sectors). The identification strategy is based on comparing pre- and post-reform
patterns of firm births, conditional on the strength of environmental enforcement, between
treated and untreated sectors. The inspection of a long series of pre-reform firm births shows that
the common trends assumption underlying this triple differences approach holds in the data.
Enforcement capacity at the state level is measured using a composite index obtained by
aggregating various state-level indicators of institutional quality, civic participation and
institutional capacity. The estimations are based on the population of registered firms born
during the period 1998-2012. Although the formal sector contributes to only a small fraction of
total Indian output, only registered firms are subject to environmental clearance since smaller
informal firms tend to operate outside the control of pollution control authorities.
A first assessment of the raw data shows a striking difference in the patterns of firm births
between high and low enforcing states in the post-reform period for treated sectors. Regression
results confirm the negative impact of state-level enforcement on firm births after the reform,
while show no impact for untreated sectors. These findings are associated with an economically
relevant slowdown in births of polluting firms close to a 12% reduction. The effect is consistent
with an increase in average regulatory stringency driven by states with higher levels of
enforcement that tend to be larger, richer, and more developed. A more disaggregated analysis
confirms that the estimated decrease in the number of new registered firms can be most likely
attributed to an actual reduction in polluting firms rather than a switch to informality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
relevant literature on environmental decentralization and firm location. Section 3 describes the
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policy background and the reform of the EIA process introduced in 2006. The empirical model is
presented in section 6 while the data on firm births and environmental enforcement are described
in section 4. Section 5 and 7 present the empirical findings and provide support for the validity of
the identification strategy. Section 8 provides an economic quantification of the impact of the
reform and discusses policy implications. Finally, section 9 concludes.
2 Decentralization, environmental regulation and firm location
The empirical literature on the impact of environmental decentralization on firms’ behavior has
mainly focused on developed countries. Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) review this literature
and find that while earlier cross sectional studies tend to find no significant effect of
environmental regulation on firms’ decisions, more recent studies that use panel data estimations
find evidence of firms responding to variations in regulation within a country. Many empirical
studies focus on variations in regulation across counties and states of the United States (List
et al., 2003). Becker and Henderson (2000), for example, study variations in air quality regulation
across counties and find that there has been a significant relocation of polluting firms from more
to less regulated areas. Sigman (2005) shows that the decentralization of environmental
authorities in the United States has led to a 4% increase in water degradation downstream of
states that had the authority to issue and enforce permits for point source polluters.
Very few studies have focused on the impact of environmental decentralization in developing
countries. Duvivier and Xiong (2013), for example, studies trans-boundary pollution in China
where environmental policy is decentralized. Similarly to India, while the central government sets
the standards, local governments are in charge of monitoring and sanctioning. The authors
analyze the location choice of polluting firms in one of the most polluted provinces in China and
find that polluting firms tend to locate in counties that share a border with another province.
Similarly, Lipscomb and Mobarak (2016) analyze river water quality across jurisdictions in Brazil
and find a significant strategic polluting behavior around borders.
The first study to analyze firms’ location decisions in response to differential environmental
regulation across Indian states was conducted by Mani et al. (1997). The study finds that the
number of new plants is not affected by the differences in stringency of environmental regulation
at the state level. A positive correlation between their measure of enforcement and the number of
new plants, however, suggests that the variable might be capturing the quality of state
government rather than environmental enforcement. Moreover, the data date back to 1994 when
there was very little enforcement of environmental regulation across all states since prosecution
could only occur through the judicial system (Lipscomb, 2008). There is, however, evidence of
Indian firms adjusting their behavior in response to changes in environmental regulation over
time. Lipscomb (2008), for example, analyses the response of multi-product firms to changes in
enforcement at the state level. The author finds that firms react to increased stringency by
increasing the share of the product portfolio allocated to clean products. High productivity firms
invest in new and cleaner products and gain from an increase in enforcement. Kathuria (2007)
finds that an increase in informal regulation, measured by local news coverage of pollution-related
events and the number of public interest litigations filed, has reduced industrial pollution in the
state of Gujarat. On the other hand, however, formal regulation, measured by the number of staff
allocated to a state, was found not to affect polluting behavior. Issues surrounding environmental
monitoring and compliance in India have also been investigated in Duflo et al. (2013) who look
into environmental audits of industrial plants and the frequency of environmental inspections in
Gujarat. Finally, besides firm behavior, differences in the effectiveness of air and water pollution
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regulations across cities in India have also been found to affect health outcomes such as infant
mortality (Greenstone and Hanna, 2014).
3 Environmental policies in India
Environmental protection rights and duties are incorporated into the Indian Constitution. India
has an elaborate set of laws relating to environmental protection that dates back to the Water
Act in 1974. The central government, through the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF)
and the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), is in charge of planning and formulating
national policies and standards. Their implementation and enforcement are decentralized and are
the responsibility of the State Pollution Control Boards.
In addition, Indian citizens benefit from a unique approach to the enforcement of environmental
laws by exercising their constitutional right to a healthy environment in the form of Public
Interest Litigations (PILs) before the Court of Justice. PILs have resulted in some environmental
improvements on the one side, (Kathuria, 2007) but have also contributed to increase the amount
of work for state authorities because of court-ordered directives (OECD, 2006).
A compulsory Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was first introduced in India with the
Environmental Protection Act of 1986, but became effective only in 1994 when the MOEF passed
a major legislative measure (Panigrahi and Amirapu, 2012). The main purpose of the EIA is to
inform decision makers and the public about the environmental implications of a particular
project. The EIA process has been notably modified with the introduction of the 2006 EIA
notification. In particular, the reform introduced two main changes. It put greater emphasis on
public participation, through a formal consultation procedure for all firms, and initiated a process
of decentralization of the EIA procedure for certain activities. While both changes have the
potential to affect firm behavior, this paper focuses on the latter due to methodological
constraints that are explained below. The decentralization process has the potential to reduce the
burden on the central government and accelerate the approval process. On the other hand,
however, the newly created decentralized powers could be misused, if state governments intend to
actively pursue industrialization for their respective state, or be ineffective if state authorities lack
technical and financial capacity.
For the purpose of assigning polluting projects to the competent authority, the reform classifies
projects into two categories based on the potential impacts on human health and natural
resources. Projects falling into category A continue to undertake the EIA at the national level
(the untreated group), while category B projects are referred to the State Environmental Impact
Assessment Authority (SEIAA) of the state in which the project is located and form the
treatment group. The classification of projects into treated (B) and untreated (A) activities is
based on three main criteria that differ across sectors: type of activity, capacity and location.
Because the data used in the analysis do not allow for the identification of the capacity or the
exact location of a project, sectors adopting these criteria are considered to include both treated
and untreated firms. Therefore, in the analysis that follows sectors are categorized into 5 different
groups as described in Table 1. The first group includes sectors that do not have to undertake the
EIA since they are not expected to have a considerable impact on the environment. The second
and last group (2 and 5) adopt the “activity” criterion that assigns projects to either a state or a
central authority based on the type of activity. Any project within the petroleum refining
industry (sector 232 in the Table), for instance, should undertake the EIA at the central level,
while projects in the integrated paint industry (2422 in the table), are the exclusive responsibility
of state authorities. This allows to define the group “Central” composed of firms in sectors
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Table 1: Classification of sectors according to EIA status
# Treatment Group Category Criteria Sectors (NIC)
1 No EIA No EIA
Not subject to EIA
(control)
All sectors not indi-
cated below
2 Central A
Activity subject to
central-level EIA
(untreated)
111, 112, 232, 233,
269, 2412, 2421
3 Capacity A/B
State-level EIA if of
small capacity (mix
treated/untreated)
101, 102, 120, 131,
132, 141, 142, 155,
231, 271, 272, 273,
401, 451, 452, 453,
454, 2694
4 ID A/B
State-level EIA if located
within industrial district
(mix treated/untreated)
182, 1911, 2411,
2413, 2423
5 State B
Activity subject to state-
level EIA (treated)
1542, 2101a, 2102,
2422, 2430
Based on NIC (Indian National Industrial Classification) 2004. a Excludes manufac-
turing of pulp (21011)
unaffected by the decentralization reform (untreated) and the group “State” formed of firms
affected by the reform (treatment group). A second criterion distinguishes projects in terms of
capacity (group 3). Large coke oven plants (above 150,000 tons per year, 231 in the Table), for
example, are under the authority of the central government, small ones are referred to the SEIAA
in which the project is located. Because the data used in the empirical analysis do not include
information on firms’ capacity, it is not possible to distinguish between treated and untreated
firms and the group “Capacity” includes a mix of both. An attempt to separate treated and
untreated firms will be made using firm size as a proxy for capacity in section 7.1. Finally, a third
criterion categorizes projects on the basis of whether they are located within or outside a notified
industrial area (group 4). Projects in the leather/skin/hide processing industry (1911 in the
Table), for example, are subject to state level EIA only if located within an industrial
district/area. Because the exact location of a firm is unknown, the group defined as “Industrial
district (ID)” includes both treated and untreated firms.
Table 1 summarizes the five different groups of activities defined in accordance to the criteria
mentioned above. The detailed list of activities, as reported in the official 2006 EIA notification,
is provided in Table A.1 of the Appendix. SEIAAs were constituted in each state at different
points in time and all projects were treated as category A in the absence of a notified state
authority. Table A.2 of the Appendix reports the date of establishment of each SEIAA.
The EIA process is subdivided into four stages. The first stage (Screening) affects only category B
projects and is aimed at determining whether a project requires an EIA report. Projects requiring
EIA are categorized as B1 while the others are termed B2 and submit a much shorter application
form. The remaining steps apply to both categories of projects. The second stage (Scoping)
involves either the central or state authority, depending on whether the project is classified as A
or B, in determining the terms of references covering all relevant environmental concerns for the
preparation of the EIA. The third stage requires a public consultation through both a public
hearing in the proximity of the site and invitations of written responses from the concerned
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stakeholders. The final stage (Appraisal) involves the scrutiny of the EIA application that can
result in either approval or rEjection of the project. Environmental clearance is granted by the
Ministry of Environment and Forests for type A projects and by the SEIAA for type B projects.
4 Data
This section describes the data used to measure environmental enforcement across states and the
firm-level data used to analyze the relationship between the EIA reform and firm births.
4.1 State-level environmental enforcement measures
Although environmental standards for industrial pollution are determined by the central
government, evidence suggests that there are large differences across states in terms of
enforcement and compliance (OECD (2006); World Bank (2006)). Variations arise from
socio-economic differences across states but also from differences in commitment and technical
and financial capacity of state-level environmental authorities. The analysis uses five measures of
environmental enforcement aimed at capturing state-level differences in institutional capacity,
civic participation and institutional quality that are reported in Table 2. The choice of the
specific indicators was partly driven by data availability.
Institutional capacity is measured by the number of air monitoring stations. The data, taken
from the IndiaStat database, refer to the year 2007 and reveal a significant variation across states,
ranging from 2 in Bihar, Meghalaya and Uttarakhand to 42 in Maharashtra.
When formal regulation is weak, informal regulation through civic participation can play an
important role. This is particularly true in India where a democratic system allows the formation
of groups and NGOs, the press is relatively free and people are empowered with the use of public
interest litigations to demand interventions of the judiciary system. These features are
particularly relevant for this study since citizens are given an active role in the EIA procedure
through a public hearing stage. Three measures of civic participation are adopted: the number of
environmentally oriented NGOs, the number of newspaper articles mentioning
environmental-related news and the number of judgments passed by the supreme and high courts
related to environmental disputes. While civic participation can be thought to be higher in states
with low environmental compliance as a response to ineffective formal enforcement, Lal and Jha
(1999) argue that NGOs and greater judicial effort are more likely found in Indian states with
good governance indicating that strong governance is more conducive to building public
awareness about the environment. This argument supports the use of these variables as indicators
of greater environmental enforcement.
NGOs play an important role in shaping the socio-political discourse in India and there are
several examples of how these organizations have successfully promoted environmental disclosure
and raised awareness of governments and the general public (UNESCAP, 2000)1. The number of
environmentally oriented NGOs was also used in Javorcik and Wei (2003) to measure variation in
strength of environmental enforcement across countries. Another measure of public concern over
environmental issues is represented by the number of newspaper articles covering topics related to
industrial pollution. The number of newspaper articles in each state and year was obtained by
conducting a search across all English-language Indian newspapers contained in the database
Factiva for the period 1998-2006. Each search included a set of common keywords, such as
closure, court, order, fine etc., and the name of the State Pollution Control Board, e.g. Bihar
1The list of Indian NGOs was obtained from an online database: http://ngosindia.com/ accessed in June 2013.
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Table 2: Environmental enforcement measures and construction of the enforcement index
State NGOs Judgements Corruption Articles Stations Index
2013 1998-2006 2005 1998-2007 2007
Andhra Pradesh 29 4 4 213 21 2.50
Assam 7 0 15 9 12 -1.55
Bihar 2 3 20 13 2 -1.63
Chandigarh 2 2 4 5
Chhattisgarh 3 0 6 4 9 -1.60
Delhi 22 2 11 166 11 0.59
Goa 0 0 13 3
Gujarat 7 4 3 146 20 0.99
Haryana 3 1 13 21 5 -1.71
Himachal Pradesh 4 2 2 3 11 -0.72
Jammu & Kashmir 6 0 19 3 3 -2.22
Jharkhand 2 0 14 5 6 -2.10
Karnataka 17 3 17 247 14 0.83
Kerala 7 0 1 155 16 -0.25
Madhya Pradesh 12 4 18 43 26 0.59
Maharashtra 26 4 5 165 42 3.13
Meghalaya 1 0 0 2
Odisha 17 3 9 8 12 0.10
Puducherry 1 0 2 3
Punjab 1 1 7 25 15 -1.09
Rajasthan 12 0 16 6 18 -1.03
Tamil Nadu 29 2 12 443 16 2.28
Uttar Pradesh 24 4 10 111 35 2.27
Uttarakhand 4 1 2 2
West Bengal 15 2 8 120 21 0.62
Principal Component analysis:
Component Eigenvalue Proportion of Variance Cumulative
Comp1 2.730 0.546 0.546
Comp2 0.977 0.195 0.742
Comp3 0.742 0.148 0.890
Comp4 0.384 0.076 0.967
Comp5 0.165 0.033 1.000
Variable First component
NGOs 0.538
Judgments 0.463
Corruption Index -0.226
Total articles 0.451
Stations 0.491
The bottom part of the table reports the results of the principal component analysis.
The column header indicates the name of the variable and the period of reference.
State Pollution Control Board. The variable is then constructed by calculating the cumulative
number of articles referring to each State Pollution Control Board for the entire pre-reform
period. Finally, it was noted that Indian citizens can benefit from a unique approach to enforce
environmental law by exercising a constitutional right before the Supreme Court and the High
Courts in the form of Public Interest Litigations (PIL). Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain
the number of PILs filed in each state, but the number of judgments of the Supreme and High
courts offers a reasonable proxy. The list of judgments related to environmental issues for the
period 1998-2006 is obtained from the Judgments information system of the Supreme and High
courts of India. Judgments are manually assigned to each state based on the location of the firms
or the pollution control boards involved in the court case.
To measure institutional quality I use the corruption index at the state-level provided in a study
by the Centre for Media Studies issued by Transparency International India for the year 2005
(CMS, 2005). While this index is the preferred measure of corruption, it is not available for the
Union territories of Chandigarh, Goa, Meghalaya, Puducherry and Uttarakhand that are,
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therefore excluded from part of the analysis2.
All enforcement measures are time-invariant and refer to the pre-reform period with the exception
of the number of NGOs3. They are aggregated into a unique index of state-level enforcement
through principal component analysis. The use of principal component analysis is appealing
because the variables are correlated and environmental enforcement is a multifaceted concept that
none of the indicators can fully capture. The index conveys the common dimension of the data
and should, therefore, provide a better proxy of environmental enforcement than each indicator
individually. The bottom part of table 2 shows that, as expected, all measures but the corruption
index are positively related to the latent environmental enforcement measure. The first principal
component explains about 37% of the total variance in the data. The eigenvalue of the first
principal component is above two, thus I retain only the first component as enforcement index.
The index ranges between -2.22 and 3.13 and takes higher values in states where environmental
enforcement is stronger4. As a robustness check, I also construct an alternative enforcement index
where all enforcement variables, with the exception of corruption, are divided by the size of the
population. The results are reported in Table A.6, Columns 1 and 2, and show similar results.
4.2 Firm-level data
The number of new firms in each sector and year is obtained from the Orbis database of Bureau
Van Dijk who publishes data originally provided by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy
(CMIE). The database covers the universe of registered companies, i.e. all companies, public or
private, that are registered under the Companies Act, 1956 at the Registrar of Companies
(RoCs). It records about 140,000 companies created between 1998 and the end of 2012. Although
registered companies account for only 20% of all firms in India, which tend to be very small and
operate under informality, they are the most likely to be subject to pollution controls as only
large and medium-sized facilities have the required environmental clearance permits. Most
small-scale industries operate without any consent (OECD, 2006).
The analysis considers only companies belonging to the manufacturing and energy sectors. While
the database provides very little information on companies characteristics, such as assets,
employment etc., it was possible to obtain important information using the corporate
identification number (CIN) that the Ministry of Corporation assigns to each registered company
and that combines information on the year of establishment, state, 5-digit industry code
(National Industrial Classification, NIC), ownership type and a registrar code. In 1998 the Indian
Statistical office adopted a substantially different sector classification which also affected the
sector definition contained in the CIN code. To avoid problems of misclassification of some firms,
the analysis considers only firms established after 1998. This does not constitute a major
drawback since prior to 1997 there was very little enforcement of environmental regulation across
all states (Lipscomb, 2008).
2I also obtained the same results (not reported) using an alternative measure of institutional quality constructed
as the number of cases of persons arrested under the prevention of corruption act and related sections that have
obtained charges. The information is obtained from the India Bureau of Crime and was available for all states.
Similar results are also obtained excluding corruption from the enforcement index.
3The use of post-reform data on NGOs’ could be of potential concern. The results by individual component
reported in Table 4, however, show similar results across indicators suggesting that the use of a post-reform measure
of NGOs is not of particular concern.
4There are various and highly heterogeneous rules of thumbs to determine the minimum sample size for principal
component analysis (Giovannini et al., 2005). Some rules suggest a minimum of 3 or 5 observations per variable. In
this case, given that the analysis covers 20 states, the reliability of the index could be in doubt. To provide further
support to the results I also constructed an index that gives equal weights to all standardized variables. The results
are reported in Table A.6, Columns 3 and 4, and lead to very similar conclusions.
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A birth is defined as the registration of a new company in the Registrar of Companies of the
Ministry of Corporation5. Companies are assigned to the five groups reported in Table 1 based on
the sector they operate in. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to assign a particular activity
or project listed in the 2006 EIA notification to a specific sector. Projects/activities descriptions
are sometimes too broad or too narrow to perfectly match a sector as defined in standard
industrial classifications. It was, however, possible to recover some useful information from a
previous draft of the EIA notification, which was circulated few months before the official approval
of the reform, which provides a concordance table between sectors classification and activities
using the National Industrial Classification (NIC). The concordance table was later removed from
the official EIA notification. The list provided in the draft notification was supplemented by
manually matching activities that did not report a corresponding sector code. The matching of
sectors to activities was conducted at the 5-digit level and, when possible, sectors were aggregated
at the highest level that allowed a one-to-one matching between activities and sectors. The entire
list of sector-activity concordance used in the analysis is reported in Table A.1 of the Appendix
while a summary is provided in Table 1. Some sub-sectors were dropped because of ambiguous
matching with listed activities and are reported in Table A.3 of the appendix. Similar results are,
however, obtained when these sectors are included and matched to the most plausible activity.
Table 3: Number of new firms by category and year of incorporation
Year Without EIA Central-level Capacity ID State-level Total
1998 2346 160 1045 399 98 4048
1999 2438 208 1273 483 131 4533
2000 1780 154 1038 422 85 3479
2001 1497 115 1128 343 95 3178
2002 1747 154 1400 458 92 3851
2003 2284 207 2200 590 111 5392
2004 3133 225 3660 706 167 7891
2005 4097 335 5799 952 200 11383
2006 3966 351 6556 877 214 11964
2007 4944 337 7084 1020 161 13546
2008 4802 397 7984 833 155 14171
2009 5058 350 4653 699 126 10886
2010 6792 437 7297 980 187 15693
2011 7405 477 7045 1226 193 16346
2012 6534 404 5232 1007 117 13294
Total 58823 4311 63394 10995 2132 139655
Source: author’s calculations based on Orbis dataset.
The information contained in the Orbis database does not allow for the identification of a
company’s capacity or whether it was located within or outside an established industrial district.
Therefore, it was not possible to distinguish whether a company belonging to groups 3 and 4
(defined as Capacity and ID) had undertaken the EIA at the central or state level. One attempt
to distinguish large from small companies will, however, be made below using a measure of firm
size. The number of births in each group and year is reported in Table 3. The same information is
5There is the possibility that a merger between two existing firms could be treated as a new entry if a new CIN is
assigned. Nevertheless, I do not expect this to have a quantitatively relevant impact on the results given the limited
number of firms with “amalgamated” status in the data (about 1%). In addition, a change in the main activity
during the period of analysis can also result in a new CIN been assigned to the company. Nevertheless, I do not
expect this to have a significant influence on the results either, given that such a restructuring had to occur within a
limited time span from the birth of a firm to affect the analysis, and so should not be frequently encountered in the
data.
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reported by state and year in Table A.4 of the Appendix. I excluded the states and union
territories of Andaman and Nicobar, Lakshadweep, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura,
Daman and Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Arunachal Pradesh because of insufficient firm
level data and the lack of information on most enforcement measures. These states, however,
represent only about 1% of the Indian population.
4.3 Control variables
Regressions include a set of control variables such as the number of new special economic zones
(SEZs) in polluting sectors by sector-state and year, obtained from the Department of Commerce
of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, electricity prices, and changes in minimum wages in
polluting sectors, which are both provided by IndiaStat. They also include average wages by year
and state that are provided by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation
(Government of India, 2012) and are calculated from the Annual Survey of Industries that collects
information on medium and large firms in India. Wages are deflated using state-level price
indexes (source: IndiaStat).
5 Firm births and environmental enforcement
This section begins with some motivating evidence based on the relationship between state-level
enforcement and firm births across treated and untreated sectors.
Figure 1 plots the raw data and compares trends in births of polluting firms by level of
enforcement and treatment groups. The underlying trends in births by group are depicted in
Figure 3 of the Appendix. The graphs report 3-year moving averages of the number of new firms,
since annual values were too noisy in particular for the State group. States are classified into low
and high enforcing states (bottom and top 6 states respectively) and the data are normalized by
2006 values. All panels show fairly similar trends in the pre-reform period between high and low
enforcing states. On the other hand, for sectors affected by decentralization (panel b c and d), the
patterns diverge after the implementation of the reform. In particular, while firm births in low
enforcing states followed pre-reform trends, it is possible to observe a slowdown in births in high
enforcing states. These compelling patterns in the data suggest that decentralization was
associated with relatively fewer firm births in states with stricter environmental enforcement.
Before turning to the regression analysis in the next section, Figure 2 provides a more formal
visual assessment of the effects of the reform. It also offers the opportunity to test the assumption
of common trends underlying the estimations that follow. The graphs are derived from regressing
the number of firm births on a full set of state-by-sector fixed effects and a triple interaction term
between the enforcement index, group dummies and year fixed effects. Each panel plots the
resulting time-varying coefficients and the respective 95 percent confidence interval. They show
the impact of environmental enforcement on firm births over time for each group, as indicated in
the title of each graph. The comparison group is the No-EIA group that comprises non-polluting
sectors.
Figure 2 shows evidence that the reform has altered the relationship between firm births and
state-level environmental enforcement in sectors under the competence of state-level authorities
(panel d). For these treated sectors, higher enforcement at the state-level led to a decrease in firm
births after the implementation of the reform. It is also possible to notice a sharp decline for the
Industrial District group (panel c), although the effect does not persist. There is no evidence of
impact, instead, for the Capacity group. Nevertheless, these two latter groups include a mix of
treated and untreated firms so the absence of a significant impact overall might still hide some
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Figure 1: Number of new polluting firms by groups and enforcement level
(a) Central (untreated) (b) Capacity (mixed treated/untreated)
(c) ID (mixed treated/untreated) (d) State (treated)
Author’s calculation based on the Orbis database. The plots are based on 3-year moving averages. The number of
new firms is divided by 2006 values so that a value of 1.3 indicates an increase in firm births of 30% with respect to
2006.
effects that I will try to partly capture in the next section by using firm size as a proxy for
capacity.
The empirical analysis that follows focuses on the impact of decentralization for which the above
graphs serve as a test of the parallel trends hypothesis. Both panels support the validity of the
empirical design showing no evidence of differential effects of enforcement across groups before
2006. The identification of the effect of public consultations, which affected all polluting
activities, would require stronger assumptions, i.e. parallel trends across groups rather than
across groups and enforcement levels, that are not fully met by all groups, hence the focus on
decentralization only.
6 Empirical model
This section presents the empirical framework used to estimate the impact of the 2006 EIA
reform on the birth of polluting firms. It adopts a triple differences approach where the control
group includes non-polluting sectors (group 1), and the treated sectors are those included in
groups 3, 4 and 5. An additional group of untreated polluting firms is also included separately
(group 2). While environmental clearance is required for both new firms and the expansion or
modernization of existing polluting firms, the empirical analysis considers only the creation of
new firms. While high start-up costs due to environmental clearance have a direct negative effect
11
Figure 2: Event study: the effect of the EIA reform on firm births
(a) Central (untreated) (b) Capacity (mixed treated/untreated)
(c) ID (mixed treated/untreated) (d) State (treated)
Author’s calculation based on the Orbis database. The plots are created by regressing the log of new firms by sector-
state on a full set of event time indicators interacted with the state-level enforcement index and group dummies
controlling for state-by-year fixed effects. The comparison group is the No-EIA group. The dashed line indicates 95%
confidence interval.
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on entry, firm exit can also be affected but only indirectly through less competition or low
incentives to grow. Hence, this paper focuses only on firm entry as further discussed below.
The baseline regression is the following:
nijt = β1(Dt × Ej) + β2(Dt × Ej ×Gi) + α′xijt
+ρ′0wt + ρ
′
1(wt ×Gi) + γ′dij + ijt,
(1)
where nijt is the number of new firms in sector i, state j and year t, xijt is a vector of control
variables, dij is a set of state-sector fixed effects and wt are time fixed effects. Dt is a dummy
variable taking value one for the years following the implementation of the EIA notification. The
treatment effect is allowed to be heterogeneous depending on the level of enforcement in each
state, Ej . Finally, Gi is a vector of binary variables indicating the treatment group as reported in
Table 1. The excluded group is composed by non-polluting sectors that do not undertake the EIA
(group 1: No EIA). I expect the coefficient of the triple interaction term, β2, to differ between
sectors treated by decentralization (group 5: State) and untreated sectors (group 2: Central). In
particular, I expect environmental enforcement at the state level to have a larger negative effect
on the birth of polluting firms in treated sectors. For groups 3 (Capacity) and 4 (ID) the effect is
expected to be smaller as they contain a mixture of treated and untreated firms.
This approach, de facto, compares the average number of new firms born before and after the
implementation of the EIA reform, conditioned on the level of enforcement in each state.
Whether firms tended to prefer low enforcing states also prior to the reform, because of low
supervision and monitoring costs, does not affect the results as long as this behavior was uniform
across groups. A formal test is provided in the next section.
The expected effect of this decentralization process is twofold. Some states might impose more
stringent conditions than those imposed previously by the central government resulting in a
reduction of births in high enforcing states (deterrence). On the other hand, some states might
conduct a less strict EIA in order to promote industrialization, or due to technical and financial
constraints, facilitating the birth of new polluting firms (attraction). Both forces lead to relative
lower birth rates in higher-enforcing states compared to lower-enforcing states. Because the
relevance of the initial start-up costs varies across sectors, depending on the type and size of the
pollution control measures required, the effect of the reform is likely to be more visible in sectors
where the influence of such fixed costs is higher. Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify which
sectors are likely to incur greater costs, under enforcement, given the lack of systematic
information on the types and costs of pollution control requirements by sector. Therefore, the
model assumes homogeneous effects across sectors. Moreover, to reduce the scope for reverse
causality due to enforcement capacity being affected by the number of firms applying for
environmental clearance, for example because of technical constraints or increased public
awareness, the level of enforcement across states is fixed to pre-reform levels.
The model is estimated both using a simple semi-log linear estimator (OLS) and a Poisson
pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator with robust standard errors (Wooldridge, 1991). The latter
allows for the discreteness of the dependent variable and the large number of zeros. The estimator
produces consistent estimates under relatively weaker assumptions than a standard Poisson
model, but has difficulties to converge when a large number of fixed effects are included.
Because the model includes state-sector and year fixed effects it is not possible to identify the
effects of pure location, time and sector-specific variables. All specifications will control for the
average share of new firms by state6 since the level of enforcement could be correlated with other
6This is a state-level measure computed by averaging the shares of firms born in a given state and sector over
the total number of births in the sector. The simple average ensures that the state-level measure is neutral to the
importance of a particular sector in a given state.
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institutional characteristics leading to states experiencing differential growth rates, and the total
number of new firms in a sector. These linear controls, however, are also substituted by
sector-year and state-year fixed effects. Additional controls will be discussed in the next sections.
Although the EIA reform was introduced in September 2006, the decentralization process could
not actually take place unless a SEIAA was created. Because most of the SEIAAs were established
between 2007 and 2008 (table A.2 in the appendix), the variable Dt will take value one for the
post-2007 period. Using a common treatment year for all states helps avoiding endogeneity issues,
for example due to poorer states having lower enforcement levels and delaying the creation of the
SEIAA. Moreover, the creation of a SEIAA can have spillover effects in states where the authority
has not yet been established due to cross-border relocations of firms. Nevertheless, results are also
shown using the actual year of establishment of the SEIAA (Table A.5 of the Appendix).
6.1 Identification issues
At the aggregate level, enforcement capacity can be both the cause and the consequence of firms’
location choices. A larger number of polluting firms may increase the awareness of the public and
the media about pollution and lead to increasing pressure to control pollution. On the other
hand, however, more polluting firms may put pressure on the capacity of state-level authorities to
deal with non-compliance and reduce the ability of the authorities to monitor and punish
polluters. By considering only the number of new firms created each year in each state and sector
this problem is substantially reduced. Moreover, the measures of enforcement considered in the
regressions are time-invariant and, therefore, do not lead to a spurious correlation between
changes in enforcement over time and changes in the number of new firms. They also refer to the
pre-reform period and are, therefore, not influenced by the reform. Although all specifications
control for the presence of state, location and year-level unobservables, unobserved heterogeneity
could still be a concern. Nevertheless, the regressor of central interest is a three-way interaction
term, between state-level enforcement, a dummy variable indicating the post-implementation
period and a group dummy, and is less subject to endogeneity problems. Moreover, the results are
tested for robustness to the inclusion of additional control variables that should capture other
sources of unobserved variation over time, such as changes in minimum and average real wages,
electricity prices, the number of special economic zones, and sector and state by year fixed effects.
In cross-sectional studies of environmental regulation it is often argued that failing to control for
corruption creates a problem of omitted variable bias (Dean et al., 2009). High corruption often
implies lower environmental stringency but may also act as a deterrent for new investments. This
is not a concern in this study. Corruption is included as a measure of environmental stringency
since it is the best available measure of the quality of state-level institutions and it is likely that
its effect as deterrent for new businesses should not vary before and after the implementation of
the EIA notification between treatment groups.
7 Empirical results
This section begins presenting the results of estimating Equation 1 using the simplest linear
model. The results are reported in Table 4. Columns 2 to 6 show the effects of each of the five
individual enforcement measures included in the environmental enforcement index used in
Column 1. All specifications include state-by-sector and year fixed effects. The dependent
variable is the log of new firms in each sector-state cell. A set of group dummies indicates
whether the sectors are non-polluting (No EIA, the omitted baseline) or subject to different EIA
criteria (Central, Capacity, ID and State). These dummies are interacted with the post-reform
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dummy (Dt) and the enforcement index at the state level (Ej) to estimate how firm births have
been affected by the reform depending on the enforcement capacity of states. Standard errors are
clustered at the state level. Moreover, to further deal with potential serial correlation at the
treatment level, I follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and obtain similar results using bootstrapped
standard errors and averages of pre- and post-reform data (Table A.7 of the Appendix).
Table 4: Base results: log-linear model. Impact of the EIA reform by groups
Dependent variable: log of new firms by sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Index NGOs Judgments Corruption News Monitor
Dt x Central (A) -0.162** -0.102 -0.148*** -0.139** -0.125* -0.139**
(0.060) (0.078) (0.042) (0.049) (0.062) (0.057)
Dt x Capacity (A/B) -0.080 -0.099 -0.088* -0.092* -0.093* -0.125**
(0.061) (0.058) (0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.050)
Dt x ID (A/B) 0.095 0.135 0.112* 0.042 0.144** 0.063
(0.067) (0.089) (0.055) (0.062) (0.065) (0.072)
Dt x State (B) 0.078 0.123 0.054 -0.101 0.016 -0.025
(0.055) (0.089) (0.065) (0.077) (0.067) (0.083)
Dt x Ej 0.019 0.010** 0.043 0.012* 0.001** -0.001
(0.035) (0.004) (0.028) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004)
Dt x Ej x Central (A) 0.045 -0.002 0.033 -0.019 0.000 0.004
(0.032) (0.006) (0.033) (0.012) (0.000) (0.005)
Dt x Ej x Capacity (A/B) 0.020 0.006 -0.001 -0.013 0.000 0.008
(0.027) (0.004) (0.025) (0.008) (0.000) (0.005)
Dt x Ej x ID (A/B) -0.068* -0.013* -0.078* 0.010 -0.001*** -0.002
(0.039) (0.007) (0.038) (0.012) (0.000) (0.005)
Dt x Ej x State (B) -0.152** -0.028*** -0.152*** 0.002 -0.001** -0.009*
(0.055) (0.007) (0.043) (0.017) (0.000) (0.005)
State-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11709 12749 12749 11709 12749 12749
State-sectors 1411 1676 1676 1411 1676 1676
P-value of t-test for coefficients of triple interactions
Central = Capacity 0.284 0.238 0.347 0.579 0.411 0.435
Central = ID 0.006 0.303 0.026 0.077 0.001 0.289
Central = State 0.005 0.013 0.000 0.283 0.005 0.081
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This
table reports only the relevant interaction terms. All specifications are, however, estimated including
all interaction terms as reported in Equation 1. They also include the average share of new firms
in each state-year and the total number of new firms in each sector-year, which have been omitted
from the table. Dt is a dummy indicating the post-reform period and Ej is enforcement at state-level.
These are interacted with category dummies: Central, Capacity, ID and State. The omitted category
is “No EIA” (non-polluting firms). The enforcement measure used in each specification is indicated
in the column header. Individual measures of enforcement are standardized to have mean zero.
Results show that the decentralization of the EIA process has led to a relative decrease in firm
births in states with higher environmental enforcement for treated sectors. Considering Column 1,
the strength of environmental enforcement is shown to have a larger negative effect, after the
reform, for firms in sectors of exclusive competence of SEIAA authorities (State, category B). The
coefficient of the triple interaction term for the State group is negative and statistically different
from that of the untreated group (Central), as shown by the t-tests reported at the bottom of the
table. The overall effect of the reform for the State group can be computed considering the
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coefficient of the interaction term “Dt × State (B)” (not significant) and of the triple interaction
term “Dt × Ej × State (B)”7. The insignificant coefficient of the “Dt × State (B) ” term suggests
that for a state of average enforcement capacity, decentralization did not strengthen pollution
control8. However, because the enforcement index ranges between -2.22 and 3.13, results indicate
that the reform led to an increase in births in low enforcing states and a decrease in births in
high-enforcing states with respect to the baseline. The effect is economically relevant. A
one-standard deviation (1.6) increase in the enforcement index produces a 17% decrease in the
number of new firms. A similar effect is also found for firms subject to state-level EIA if located
within an industrial district while the coefficient related to the third group of sectors (Capacity) is
very small and not statistically significant. This latter group comprises a mix of treated and
untreated firms that are subject to state-level EIA only if of small capacity. The results seem to
suggest that most companies are of large capacity and, therefore, unaffected by the reform. This
issue will be explored further below. The results are consistent across all different individual
measures of enforcement, although, in few instances, some coefficients are not significant9.
Table 5 tests the robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional control variables. The
first column control for the number of new special economic zones (SEZs) in polluting sectors by
sector-state and year. SEZs offer notable advantages, such as tax exemptions, to new firms. India
is one the first countries to recognize the importance of SEZs and the first zone was created in
1965. The Indian government passed the SEZ act in 2005 in order to increase investors’
confidence. The bill was implemented in 2006 and brought about a simplification of the
bureaucratic procedures. While most of the SEZs involve only the information technology sectors
(55%) it is still important to consider those that concerned polluting sectors (about 20% including
general multi-product SEZs) as they could induce possible confounding effects if omitted. The
creation of a SEZ has a positive impact on the number of new firms while the results pertaining
the reform remain almost unchanged.
Results reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 are obtained after controlling for the average
wage in each state and year, and changes in minimum wages in polluting sectors. The inclusion of
these variables does not significantly affect the results. Changes in average wages do not have a
significant effect on firm births. While wages are usually found to be an important determinant of
firms’ location decisions, their poor performance in these specifications could be attributed to the
limited variation in real wages over time.
The specification reported in Column 4 controls for changes in electricity prices that could affect
location choices and be also potentially correlated with environmental enforcement. Differences in
electricity prices, however, are likely to weakly reflect the commitment towards the environment
of Indian states. Energy prices are instead a powerful political tool. Higher prices for the
commercial and industrial sectors are often imposed to subsidize the agricultural sector and the
rural poor, in particular in the proximity of state elections (Badiani et al., 2012). The results are
7The overall effects depends on the level of enforcement according to the following relationship:
δnijt
δDt
= 0.078 −
0.152× Ej .
8The negative and significant coefficient of “Dt ×Central (A)”, combined with the insignificant interaction term,
would suggest that sectors in the Central group experienced a generalized decline in firm births in the post reform
period across all states independently of the level of enforcement. This effect could be picking up the impact of the
first component of the reform, i.e. a greater emphasis on public consultation that affected all polluting activities
(both A and B projects), including those under the competence of the central authorities. This coefficient, however,
is not stable. It changes sign or becomes insignificant in following specifications (Poisson estimates). Moreover, this
interpretation requires stronger identification assumptions as described in section 5. I, therefore, prefer to treat this
result with caution.
9Similar results are obtained for all enforcement measures when excluding the Union territories for which corruption
data are not available.
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Table 5: Log-linear model: additional control variables
Dependent variable: log of new firms by sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)a
Dt x Central (A) -0.158** -0.159** -0.164** -0.163** -0.144** 0.835*** 0.674**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.229) (0.285)
Dt x Capacity (A/B) -0.073 -0.073 -0.087 -0.085 -0.034 2.201*** 2.189***
(0.060) (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) (0.056) (0.437) (0.452)
Dt x ID (A/B) 0.094 0.094 0.074 0.078 0.109 0.944** 1.242**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.076) (0.077) (0.067) (0.342) (0.462)
Dt x State (B) 0.083 0.082 0.080 0.076 -0.035 1.289* 1.671**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.065) (0.638) (0.640)
Dt x Ej 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.016 0.106*** 0.168*** 0.046***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.013) (0.021) (0.008)
Dt x Ej x Central (A) 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.043 0.030 0.014
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.032) (0.010)
Dt x Ej x Capacity (A/B) 0.023 0.022 0.021 0.020 -0.007 -0.010 -0.001
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.009)
Dt x Ej x ID (A/B) -0.072* -0.072* -0.074* -0.077* -0.077* -0.098** -0.028*
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.015)
Dt x Ej x State (B) -0.149** -0.149** -0.150** -0.149** -0.100* -0.128** -0.036**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.050) (0.052) (0.015)
SEZ 0.036* 0.035* 0.035* 0.034*
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Average wages 18.566 23.737 -0.046
(67.354) (67.076) (74.909)
Minimum wage 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Electricity price -0.399*
(0.219)
State-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State-year FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector-year FE No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 11709 11709 11709 11709 11709 11709 11709
State-sectors 1411 1411 1411 1411 1411 1411 1411
P-value of t-test for coefficients of triple interactions
Central = Capacity 0.267 0.247 0.203 0.185 0.071 0.130 0.079
Central = ID 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.002
Central = State 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.014 0.008 0.002
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This
table reports only the relevant interactions terms. All specifications are, however, estimated including all
interaction terms as reported in Equation 1. Dt is a dummy indicating the post-reform period and Ej is
the enforcement index at state-level. These are interacted with category dummies: Central, Capacity, ID
and State. The omitted category is “No EIA” (non-polluting firms). a In Column 7 the enforcement index
indicates the rank of a state where 1 indicates the state with the lowest level of enforcement and 20 the
state with the highest level of the ranking.
robust to the inclusion of electricity prices that are found to have a negative effect on firm births.
The results obtained so far have helped to deal with the concern that variations in environmental
enforcement across states could proxy for differences in other state level unobservable
characteristics. It is, however, possible that some differences in the policy environment remain
unmeasured. The results reported in Columns 5 and 6 substitute linear controls with state-by-year
and sector-by-year fixed effects and show similar effects. Finally, the last column uses the ranking
of states by level of enforcement rather than the actual values of the index. Results show that
moving up one position in the ranking decreases the number of firm births by 3.6% on average.
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Table 6 reports the results obtained using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator.
These results also support the central hypothesis: decentralization has produced a relative
decrease in firm births in states with greater enforcement capacity. The results are robust to the
inclusion of the additional control variables, previously described, as reported in Columns 2 to 6.
An additional robustness check involves a placebo difference in difference exercise considering firm
births in pre-treatment period. Table A.8 of the Appendix reports the estimates of three
specifications that consider 2003, 2004 and 2005 as fake treatment events. The estimates of the
interaction terms from the placebo tests are not statistically different from zero in all
specifications.
7.1 Small versus large capacity firms
Table 7: Small versus large companies in the “Capacity” group
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Log (new firms) New firms
Method: OLS Poisson
Dt x Central -0.178*** -0.013
(0.057) (0.080)
Dt x Large -0.023 0.018
(0.072) (0.054)
Dt x Small -0.068 0.187
(0.057) (0.122)
Dt x EI 0.062 0.117
(0.084) (0.077)
Dt x State 0.049 0.204***
(0.071) (0.070)
Dt x Ej 0.003 -0.066
(0.031) (0.042)
Dt x Ej x Central (A) 0.052 0.012
(0.033) (0.066)
Dt x Ej x Large (A) 0.017 -0.031
(0.043) (0.041)
Dt x Ej x Small (B) -0.019 -0.205*
(0.028) (0.120)
Dt x Ej x EI (A/B) -0.078* -0.145***
(0.038) (0.048)
Dt x Ej x State (B) -0.149** -0.120***
(0.056) (0.042)
State-sector FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
State time-trend Yes Yes
Sector time-trend Yes No
Observations 12553 23449
Sector-state 1418 1603
P-value of t-test for coefficients of triple interactions
Central = Large 0.462 0.436
Central = Small 0.015 0.072
Central = ID 0.003 0.010
Central = State 0.005 0.021
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table re-
ports only the relevant interactions terms. Dt is a
dummy indicating the post-reform period and Ej is
the enforcement index at state-level. These are inter-
acted with category dummies: Central, Capacity, ID
and State. The omitted category is “No EIA” (non-
polluting firms).
The Capacity group includes a mix of treated and untreated firms since new firms are subject to
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state-level EIA based on capacity, which is not observed in the data. In this section, I use firm
size as a proxy for capacity in an attempt to separate treated from untreated firms. In particular,
I consider the classification of companies constructed by Bureau van Dijk, the commercial
provider of the Orbis database (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2015). This classification allows the
distinction between small, medium and large firms and is based on a mix of information on
annual turnover, operating revenues or employees10. Although this classification is not intended
to measure capacity it can provide a reasonable approximation. The results reported in Table 7
show that the effect is indeed negative and much larger for small firms, i.e. those more likely to
be subject to state-level EIA. The effect is more evident considering the Poisson
pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimation. This confirms once again that the observed negative
effects can be attributed to the decentralization process that has affected only certain polluting
activities such as small firms in selected sectors (listed in Table 1 under Capacity group).
8 Discussion and policy implications
The results obtained so far point towards a negative effect of state-level environmental
enforcement on firm births after decentralization. This conclusion is reinforced when considering
the possibility that states applying a more stringent environmental clearance process may
attempt to mitigate its negative effects by offering financial incentives to new plants. Overall, the
decrease in the number of polluting firms in high-enforcing states has been substantially larger
than the increase experienced by low enforcing states given the smaller size of their economies. A
simple back-of-the-envelope estimation of the overall impact of decentralization can be obtained
by predicting state-level changes in firm births using the coefficients of the interactions terms
multiplied by the enforcement index. The impact is economically relevant. About 1200 new firms
where established in sectors belonging to the State group across all India in the pre-reform period
(from 1998 to 2006) versus 930 in the post-reform period. The estimate indicates that as many as
250 (20%) additional new firms would have been created in the absence of decentralization over
the entire post-reform period. The impact becomes significantly larger, in absolute terms, when
considering the ID group. The reform has reduced the number of new polluting firms by 10% (530
unborn firms) in sectors belonging to the ID group. Overall, this suggests a 12% decrease in the
number of new polluting firms across both groups.
Some simple correlations suggest that lower enforcing states tend to be poorer and with lower
levels of education. If differences in the stringency of the EIA process were to trigger a strategic
response from polluting firms intending to enjoy less strict assessments, these states could benefit
from the increased comparative advantage in polluting sectors (Kahn and Mansur, 2013).
Nevertheless, the negative consequences of pollution on health and related socio-economic
outcomes, as described in Graff Zivin and Neidell (2013), could be substantial and could
significantly offset the benefits.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to produce welfare considerations or infer the overall impact of
the reform on pollution as this would require pollution data on both accepted and rEjected
projects, and on previously established firms. The pre-reform EIA was considered to be relatively
lax (Jha-Thakur, 2011) and given the anecdotal evidence on the proliferation of unchecked
polluting firms, the results show that the reform has been successful in limiting the creation of
new polluting activities. Nevertheless, pre-existing firms could now pollute more or stay in
business longer as a result of a decrease in firm births with negative implications for the
10Using actual data on employees, turnover or assets from the Orbis dataset was not possible given the high number
of missing data-points in these variables.
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environment. While firm entry is likely to be directly affected by the reform, as it increases initial
sunk costs, the study of firm exit could also provide useful insights. Various hypothesis can be
formulated about the impact of the reform on exit. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, if the
reform reduces competition from new firms it could reduce exits. On the other hand, however,
because modernization and expansion projects are also subjected to the new regulation, it could
also negatively affect survival. Unfortunately, while the date of entry is clearly indicated in the
firm registration code (CIN), exit is not easily identifiable in the dataset and could be confounded
with temporary closure or lack of reporting. I, therefore, have to defer these issues to future
research with more accurate information on exits.
It is also worth noting that the decentralization process has so far only involved sectors with
relatively lower polluting capacity. This has important implications for both the extent of the
impact of the current reform and a possible further expansion of the decentralization process
towards more polluting sectors. On the one hand, the impact of the examined decentralization
process on pollution might be small given the relatively lower pollution intensity of the affected
sectors. On the other hand, expanding the process to sectors with greater polluting potential
could either lead to an even greater reduction in firm births since abatement costs are
substantially higher for these activities or, for the same reason, a greater spatial relocation
towards low enforcing states. The impact on firm births and pollution of a further expansion of
the reform is, therefore, ambiguous.
8.1 Informality
Although the analysis considers only registered firms, the presence of a large informal economy
raises the concern that the estimated decline in firm births could have translated into an increase
in informality, which implies no gains in terms of pollution reduction. Moreover, the presence of
informality in some sectors more than in others might have affected the results. In an attempt to
provide some empirical evidence on the role of informality, I gathered data on the incidence of
informality by sectors from Nataraj (2010). Although the latest information refers to 1999 (table
A.9 of the Appendix), it is reasonable to expect that the broad categorization into low and high
informality sectors did not substantially change over a decade. I then decomposed the results by
sector for the group State and ID, where both high and low informality sectors are present. The
Capacity and Central groups are instead mainly characterized by sectors with low incidence of
informality. Results are reported in Table 8 and show a greater negative impact of enforcement in
sectors with low levels of informality. First, these results suggest that the observed differences
between the untreated (Central) and treated groups are not driven by a larger presence of highly
informal sectors in the latter groups. Second, this suggestive evidence could point towards an
actual decrease in firm births rather than an increase in informality since enforcement is found to
affect firm births in sectors where switching to informality is a less feasible option. The Factories
Act of 1948 requires all firms with more than 10 employees to register (20 workers if not using
electricity). Most sectors showing low-level of informality tend to be more capital-good oriented
and/or characterized by larger production scales that facilitate detection by the authorities and
would also unlikely avoid public scrutiny in terms of environmental impact. Informality, however,
could also be driven by economic convenience considerations that could be altered by the reform.
A stricter EIA procedure, for example, could impose a higher burden on new firms sufficient to
justify informality, and so the avoidance of environmental compliance costs, even in sectors where
it is a less common practice. Nevertheless, La Porta and Shleifer (2014), by comparing formal and
informal firms in several countries including India, find that formal firms are quite distinct from
informal ones and hardly any of the formal firms had ever been informal. Formal entrepreneurs
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Table 8: Impact of the EIA reform by sector with low and high informality
Dependent Variable: Log (new) New (1998 - 2012)
Method: OLS Poisson Number of births Type
Dt X Ej 0.019 -0.037 58823 -
(0.035) (0.033)
Dt X Ej X Central (A) 0.045 0.004 4311 Low informality
(0.032) (0.034)
Dt X Ej X Capacity (A/B) 0.020 -0.016 63394 Low informality
(0.027) (0.071)
ID (A/B):
Dt X Ej X Plastic (2413) -0.084 -0.135** 410 Low informality
(0.067) (0.066)
Dt X Ej X Fur (182) -0.055 0.133 561 High informality
(0.128) (0.123)
Dt X Ej X Leather (1911) 0.044 -0.042 427 High informality
(0.137) (0.190)
Dt X Ej X Pharma (2423) -0.014 -0.017 7838 Low informality
(0.032) (0.036)
Dt X Ej X Chemicals (2411) -0.182*** -0.064 1759 Low informality
(0.055) (0.058)
State (A):
Dt X Ej X Sugar (1542) -0.122 0.066 350 High informality
(0.111) (0.079)
Dt X Ej X Paper (2101) -0.151** -0.038 1192 Low informality
(0.066) (0.090)
Dt X Ej X Paints (2422) -0.243*** -0.171*** 513 Low informality
(0.063) (0.061)
State-sector FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 11513 20670
Sector-state 1411 1411
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
This table reports only the relevant interactions terms. Dt is a dummy indicating the period
following the year reported on the column header and Ej is the enforcement index at state-
level. These are interacted with category dummies (Central, Capacity) and sector dummies for
sector belonging to the ID and State category. The omitted category is “No EIA” (non-polluting
firms). The sector 2430 was omitted because of limited firm births (77).
are usually more educated and productive, and are willing to bear the cost of government
regulation in order to advertise their products, raise outside capital, and access public goods. In
contrast, less able entrepreneurs would not be able to offset the costs from taxes and regulations.
Still, EIA-related costs could drive informality choices of firms at the margin. Overall, because of
the highlighted differences between formal and informal businesses, a stricter EIA is likely to lead
only relatively few firms to choose the informality option, which are not expected to significantly
drive the results.
9 Conclusions
The decentralization of environmental regulation and enforcement has the potential to lead to a
more efficient and transparent system of pollution control and management. On the other hand,
it carries the risk of inducing a race-to-the bottom competition among local authorities and to
suffer from the consequences of heterogeneous financial and technical constraints across states.
The 2006 reform of the EIA process in India has provided a useful setting to test these hypotheses
in a context where environmental enforcement varies notably across states.
22
This paper has investigated whether the decentralization of the EIA process in India, initiated in
2006, has affected firms’ behavior across the country. By considering all registered manufacturing
and energy companies, the analysis covers the entire formal economy. The results show that the
reform has produced a significant change in firm births in polluting sectors and has led to a
relative decrease in birth rates in states with higher enforcement levels. The results are robust to
different specifications and are not driven by pre- or post- reform shocks or trends. They are also
suggestive of an actual decrease in the number of new polluting firms rather than a switch to
informality that would imply no gains in terms of environmental benefits.
A stricter EIA process implies that fewer firms are given permission to operate. The findings
indicate that the decentralization process has led to an increase in the average regulatory
stringency and has been successful in reducing the number of polluting activities. The effects,
however, have not been equally distributed and have only accrued to high-enforcing states. If the
regulatory gap between low and high enforcing states is maintained, the reform could, however,
potentially trigger an opportunistic behavior by poorer and less developed low-enforcing states
aimed at attracting new polluting industry. While the economic gains could be substantial, the
health and environmental consequence could also be considerable. This has important
implications for future amendments of the EIA regulation that should not ignore the great
disparities in environmental enforcement across states. Assistance in the form of training
programs or funding, for example, could be provided to states that face technical or financial
constraints.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Activities listed in the EIA notification, their categorization and the corresponding NIC
classification
Project or Activity NIC 3 digit A B Group
Mining, extraction of natural resources and power generation
Mining of minerals
101, 102,
120, 131,
132, 141,
142
≥ 50 ha. of mining
lease area; Asbestos
mining irrespective of
mining area
<50 ha; 5 ha of mining
lease area.
Capacity
Offshore and onshore oil and
gas exploration, development
and production
111, 112 All projects Central
River Valley projects 401, 452
(i) > 50 MW hydro-
electric power genera-
tion; (ii) > 10,000 ha.
of culturable command
area
(i) < 50 MW > 25
MW hydroelectric
power generation;
(ii) < 10,000 ha. of
culturable command
area
Capacity
Thermal Power Plants 401
500 MW (coal/ lignite/
naphta and gas based);
50 MW (Pet coke diesel
and all other fuels)
< 500 MW (coal/
lignite/ naptha and
gas based); <50 MW;
≥5MW (Pet coke
,diesel and all other
fuels)
Capacity
Nuclear power projects and
processing of nuclear fuel
401,452,
233
All projects Central
Primary Processing
Coal washeries 101, 102
≥ 1 million ton/ an-
num throughput of
coal
<1 million ton/ annum
throughput of coal
Capacity
Mineral beneficiation -
≥ 0.1 million ton/ an-
num mineral through-
put
< 0.1million ton/ an-
num mineral through-
put
Capacity
Materials Production
Metallurgical industries (fer-
rous and non ferrous)
271, 272
a)Primary metallur-
gical industry: All
projects; b) Sponge
iron manufacturing: ≥
200TPD; c) Secondary
metallurgical process-
ing industry: All toxic
and heavy ≥ 20,000
tonnes / annummetal
producing units
Sponge iron man-
ufacturing: < 200
TPD; Secondary met-
allurgical processing
industry: i) All toxic
and heavy metal pro-
ducing units: < 20,000
tonnes /annum; ii) All
other non-toxic sec-
ondary metallurgical
processing industries
> 5000 tonnes/annum
Capacity
Cement plants 269
1.0 million tonnes/ an-
num production capac-
ity
<1.0 million tonnes/
annum production ca-
pacity. All Stand alone
grinding units
Capacity
Materials Processing
Petroleum refining industry 232 All projects Central
Coke oven plants 231
≥ 2,50,000 tonnes/ an-
num
< 2,50,000 and ≥
25,000 tonnes/ annum
Capacity
Asbestos milling and asbestos
based products
269, 142 All projects Central
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Chlor-alkali industry 2411
>300 TPD production
capacityor a unit lo-
cated out side the noti-
fied Industrial district/
district
<300 TPD production
capacity and located
within a notified Indus-
trial district/ district
Capacity
Soda ash Industry - All projects Central
Leather/skin/hide processing
industry
1911, 182
New projects outside
the Industrial district
or expansion of existing
units out side the In-
dustrial district
All new or expansion of
projects located within
a notified Industrial
district/ district
Industrial
district
Manufacturing/Fabrication
Chemical fertilizers 2412 All projects Central
Pesticides industry 2421
All units produc-
ing technical grade
pesticides
Central
Petrochemical complexes (in-
dustries based on processing of
petroleum fractions and nat-
ural gas and/or reforming to
aromatics)
- All projects Central
Manmade fibres manufacturing 2430 Rayon Others State
Petrochemical based process-
ing (processes other than
cracking and reformat not
covered under complexes)
-
Located out side the
notified Industrial dis-
trict/ district
Located in a notified
Industrial district/ dis-
trict
Industrial
district
Synthetic organic chemicals in-
dustry (dyes and dye; interme-
diates; bulk drugs and interme-
diates; synthetic rubbers; basic
organic chemicals, other syn-
thetic organic chemicals and
chemical intermediates includ-
ing pesticides intermediates)
2411, 2413,
2423
Located out side the
notified Industrial dis-
trict/ district
Located in a notified
Industrial district/ dis-
trict
Industrial
district
Distilleries 155
(i) All Molasses
based distilleries;
(ii) All Cane juice/
non-molasses based
distilleries ≥ 30 KLD
All Cane juice/non-
molasses based distil-
leries <30 KLD
Capacity
Integrated paint industry 2422 All projects State
Pulb and paper industry ex-
cluding manufacturing of pa-
per waste from paper and man-
ufacture of paper from ready
pulp with out bleaching
2101, 2102 Pulp manufacturing
Paper manufacturing
without pulp
State
Sugar Industry 1542
≥ 5000 tcd cane crush-
ing capacity
State
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Table A.2: Date of constitution of State EIA Authority
State Date of constitution of SEIAA
Andhra Pradesh 4th July 2007
Arunachal Pradesh 27th March 2008
Bihar 7th February 2011
Chandigarh 21st August 2009
Chhattisgarh 9th January 2008
Dadra and Nagar Haveli 11th October 2007
Daman & Diu 11th October 2007
Delhi 30th July 2008
Goa 15th April 2010
Gujarat 12th June 2007
Haryana 21st April 2008
Himachal Pradesh 11th October 2007
Jammu and Kashmir 8th January 2008
Jharkhand 20th December 2012
Karnataka 11th June 2007
Kerala 3rd November 2011
Madhya Pradesh 8th January 2008
Maharashtra 21st April 2008
Meghalaya 23rd July 2007
Nagaland 15th April 2010
Orissa 17th November 2008
Puducherry 13th December 2007
Punjab 19th November 2007
REjasthan 30th July 2008
Sikkim 8th July 2008
Tamil Nadu 3rd March 2008
Uttar Pradesh 12th July 2007
Uttarakhand 22nd September 2008
West Bengal 13th April 2007
Table A.3: Sectors excluded from the analysis because of ambiguities in their classification
NIC code Description
103 Extraction and agglomeration of peat [incl. digging of peat]
181 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel
192 Manufacture of footwear.
261 Manufacture of glass and glass products
281 Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs and steam generators
289 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products; metal working service activities
2410 Manufacture of basic chemicals
2420 Manufacture of other chemical products
2424 Manufacture of soap and detergents
2429 Manufacture of other chemical product n.e.c.
2109 Manufacture of other articles of paper
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Table A.4: Number of new firms by category and state
State Without EIA Large Central-level ID State-level Total
Andhra Pradesh 3281 326 4909 1406 185 6826
Assam 301 52 488 27 16 583
Bihar 454 30 1733 124 14 1901
Chandigarh 326 16 325 180 18 539
Chhattisgarh 265 56 1041 49 8 1154
Delhi 11984 512 12018 1823 440 14793
Goa 207 14 258 28 10 310
Gujarat 6200 803 4110 1346 171 6430
Haryana 1349 61 743 200 40 1044
Himachal Pradesh 134 10 514 83 10 617
Jammu & Kashmir 123 12 177 24 5 218
Jharkhand 242 29 1053 39 3 1124
Karnataka 3474 169 3291 407 136 4003
Kerala 1179 96 1639 274 46 2055
Madhya Pradesh 1075 164 2065 387 57 2673
Maharashtra 12822 875 11306 2061 498 14740
Meghalaya 48 13 170 7 3 193
Odisha 531 78 2165 91 19 2353
Puducherry 89 6 86 33 6 131
Punjab 1202 78 858 197 46 1179
Rajasthan 1919 186 4711 435 66 5398
Tamil Nadu 5185 266 3898 652 173 4989
Uttar Pradesh 2121 135 1776 668 56 2635
Uttarakhand 217 19 163 50 4 236
West Bengal 4095 305 3897 404 102 4708
Total 58823 4311 63394 10995 2132 139655
Source: author’s calculations based on Orbis dataset.
Figure 3: Number of new firms by groups and year
Author’s calculation based on the Orbis database. The plots are based on 3-year moving averages.
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Table A.5: Impact of the EIA reform by groups: date of creation of state-level EIA Authorities
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: log (new firms) New firms
Method: OLS Poisson
Dt x Central (A) -0.158** -0.112
(0.069) (0.080)
Dt x Capacity (A/B) 0.008 -0.016
(0.049) (0.093)
Dt x ID (A/B) 0.086 -0.185
(0.091) (0.123)
Dt x State (B) -0.011 -0.121
(0.069) (0.113)
Dt x Ej 0.006 -0.059*
(0.031) (0.034)
Dt x Ej x Central (A) 0.034 0.008
(0.037) (0.029)
Dt x Ej x Capacity (A/B) -0.019 0.026
(0.024) (0.051)
Dt x Ej x ID (A/B) -0.089* -0.084**
(0.051) (0.039)
Dt x Ej x State (B) -0.129** -0.062
(0.055) (0.076)
Sector-state FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 11709 21165
State-sectors 1392 1392
P-value of t-test for coefficients of triple interactions
Central = Capacity 0.101 0.685
Central = ID 0.006 0.046
Central = State 0.020 0.323
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthe-
ses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 This table
reports only the relevant interactions terms. Estimates
refer to most comprehensive specification. Dt is a dummy
indicating the period after the creation of EIA authorities
and Ej is enforcement at state-level. These are interacted
with category dummies: Central, Capacity, ID and State.
The omitted category is “No EIA” (non-polluting firms).
The enforcement measure used in each specification is in-
dicated in the column header.
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Table A.6: Results using alternative enforcement index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PCA: ratios Equal weights
to standardized variables
Depend variable: Log (new firms) New firms Log (new firms) New firms
Method: OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Dt x Central -0.252*** -0.180 -0.272*** -0.204*
(0.067) (0.112) (0.066) (0.108)
Dt x Capacity (A/B) 0.396*** 0.268** 0.385*** 0.250**
(0.080) (0.127) (0.081) (0.117)
Dt x ID (A/B) 0.060 -0.014 0.070 0.059
(0.086) (0.146) (0.083) (0.139)
Dt x State (B) -0.050 -0.137 -0.032 -0.105
(0.052) (0.115) (0.054) (0.123)
Dt x Ej 0.068* -0.037 0.145 -0.141
(0.037) (0.043) (0.109) (0.117)
Dt x Ej x Central (A) 0.015 0.023 0.083 0.099
(0.046) (0.050) (0.119) (0.133)
Dt x Ej x Capacity (A/B) 0.033 -0.090 0.098 -0.181
(0.033) (0.079) (0.091) (0.208)
Dt x Ej x ID (A/B) -0.078* -0.128** -0.208* -0.445***
(0.040) (0.056) (0.114) (0.147)
Dt x Ej x State (B) -0.224*** -0.131* -0.568*** -0.366
(0.051) (0.071) (0.147) (0.224)
Sector-state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11709 21165 11709 21165
State-sectors 1411 1411 1411 1411
P-value of t-test for coefficients of triple interactions
Central = Capacity 0.495 0.084 0.841 0.138
Central = ID 0.110 0.038 0.048 0.000
Central = State 0.002 0.029 0.001 0.020
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Results are obtained using a alternative enforcement indexes. In Columns 1 and
2 the index is obtained with principal component analysis and enforcement variables are
divided by the size of the population in each state with the exception of the corruption
index. In Columns 3 and 4 the index is obtained by given equal weights to all standardized
variables. This table reports only the relevant interactions terms. Estimates refer to most
comprehensive specification. Dt is a dummy indicating the period after the creation of
EIA authorities and Ej is enforcement at state-level. These are interacted with category
dummies: Central, Capacity, ID and State. The omitted category is “No EIA” (non-
polluting firms).
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Table A.7: Results using bootstrapped standard errors and pre-post treatment averages
Log (new firms) New firms Log (new firms) New firms
OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
Dt x Central (A) -0.161*** -0.193 -0.081 -0.149*
(0.054) (0.130) (0.089) (0.080)
Dt x Capacity (A/B) -0.083 0.191 -0.082 -0.195*
(0.057) (0.125) (0.109) (0.112)
Dt x ID (A/B) 0.085 -0.077 0.213*** -0.041
(0.071) (0.150) (0.062) (0.118)
Dt x State (B) 0.076 -0.133 -0.025 0.154
(0.060) (0.144) (0.079) (0.138)
Dt x Ej 0.020 -0.021 0.099** -0.067**
(0.039) (0.058) (0.036) (0.032)
Dt x Ej x Central (A) 0.049 0.026 0.011 0.050
(0.036) (0.067) (0.039) (0.063)
Dtx Ej x Capacity (A/B) 0.018 -0.100 0.023 -0.108
(0.025) (0.090) (0.025) (0.067)
Dtx Ej x ID (A/B) -0.080** -0.146* -0.123** -0.094**
(0.041) (0.070) (0.045) (0.041)
Dt x Ej x State (B) -0.148*** -0.136 -0.116** -0.118**
(0.057) (0.104) (0.054) (0.058)
State - sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 11709 21165 2528 2822
State-sectors 1411 1411 1411 1411
P-value of t-test for coefficients of triple interactions
Central = Capacity 0.263 0.103 0.703 0.072
Central = ID 0.002 0.068 0.007 0.027
Central = State 0.002 0.080 0.046 0.022
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports only the relevant interactions
terms. All specifications are, however, estimated including all interaction terms as reported
in Equation 1. Dt is a dummy indicating the post-reform period and Ej is enforcement
at state-level. These are interacted with category dummies: Central, Capacity, ID and
State. The omitted category is “No EIA” (non-polluting firms). Columns 1 and 2 report
bootstrapped standard errors using state-level clusters and 500 repetitions. In column 3
and 4 data are averaged over the pre and post period.
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Table A.8: Placebo difference in differences test on pre-reform period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dt = 2002 2003 2004 2005
Dt x Central (A) 0.008 0.026 0.042 0.035
(0.909) (0.783) (0.600) (0.715)
Dt x Capacity (A/B) 0.055 0.058 0.042 0.033
(0.317) (0.403) (0.561) (0.485)
Dt x ID (A/B) 0.062 0.019 -0.037 0.046
(0.339) (0.758) (0.624) (0.647)
Dt x State (B) 0.033 0.002 0.000 -0.078
(0.676) (0.987) (0.999) (0.554)
Dt x Ej 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.066*** 0.056***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Dt x Ej x Central (A) -0.022 -0.053 -0.055 -0.030
(0.541) (0.139) (0.211) (0.469)
Dt x Ej x Capacity (A/B) -0.019 -0.014 -0.027 0.006
(0.307) (0.519) (0.236) (0.763)
Dt x Ej x ID (A/B) -0.028 -0.017 0.011 0.029
(0.450) (0.666) (0.808) (0.561)
Dt x Ej x State (B) -0.003 0.038 0.065 0.074
(0.939) (0.382) (0.204) (0.360)
State - sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5353 5353 5353 5353
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. This table reports only the relevant interactions
terms. All specifications are, however, estimated including all interaction
terms as reported in Equation 1. They also include the average share of
new firms in each state-year and the total number of new firms in each
sector-year, which have been omitted from the table. Dt is a dummy in-
dicating the period following the year reported on the column header and
Ej is the enforcement index at state-level. These are interacted with cat-
egory dummies: Central, Capacity, ID and State. The omitted category
is “No EIA” (non-polluting firms).
Table A.9: Incidence of formality by sector in 1999
Formal Firms Formal Employees Formal Output Group
% % %
High degree of informality
Beverages, tobacco 0.1 12.7 74.1 Capacity
Wood, furniture, fixtures 0.1 0.9 15.6 NoEIA
Textile products 0.2 5.9 58 State
Other 0.3 7.3 59.4 -
Wool, silk, synthetic textiles 0.7 16.1 73.8 State
Cotton textiles 0.8 22.7 83.4 NoEIA
Food products 0.8 17.7 76.9 ID/NoEIA
Jute, vegetable fibre 0.8 50.3 98.2 State
Leather 0.9 22.4 72.4 ID
Low degree of informality
Metal products and parts 1.2 14.4 62.1 Capacity
Non-Metallic mineral products 1.4 13.4 69.6 Central/Capacity
Paper, printing, finishing 2.5 27.6 78.3 State
Basic chemicals 4.1 58.4 95.6 District/Central
Machinery and equipment 5.3 50.6 86.1 NoEIA
Rubber, plastic, petroleum, coal 5.6 46.4 88.1 ID
Electrical machinery 6.3 53.5 59 NoEIA
Transport equipment 10.3 73.1 94.2 NoEIA
Basic metal and alloys 14.3 82.6 94.5 Capacity
These estimations are taken from Nataraj (2010), page 22. Original source: Annual Survey of Industries
(ASI) and Unorganised Manufacture Survey (UMS)
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